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Face to Face with “It”: And Other 
Neglected Contexts of Health Privacy
 
1
 
ANITA L. ALLEN
 
Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy
 
University of Pennsylvania
 
LLNESS has recently emerged from the obscurity of medical trea-
tises and private diaries to acquire something like celebrity status,”
Professor David Morris astutely observes.
 
2 Great plagues and epi-
demics throughout history have won notoriety as collective disasters;
and the Western world has made curiosities of an occasional “Elephant
Man,” “Wild Boy,” or pair of enterprising “Siamese Twins.”
 
3
However, it is something new that fame is routinely achieved by a
parade of commercial medications (like Prozac and RU-486); diseases
(like bipolar disorder and autism); and ill individuals (like Philadelphia’s
own Butch Quinn, who received an experimental mechanical heart trans-
plant, and Jesse Gelsinger, who underwent gene therapy and died). Pub-
licized illness adds a new order of celebrity to men and women who
have already achieved fame. Early onset Parkinson’s added public inter-
est to the life of television actor Michael J. Fox, much as AIDS added
fascination to basketball superstar Earvin “Magic” Johnson; and schizo-
phrenia added interest to the life of Nobel laureate John Forbes Nash.
Illness has gained celebrity, and Americans have become more open
about personal health matters. Just a few decades ago, one would have
been expected to share medical problems sparingly, and mainly inside
the circle of intimate family and friends. It was considered uncouth by
the middle and educated classes to prattle on about poor digestion,
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Read 24 April 2004, as part of the symposium “Privacy.”
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David B. Morris, 
 
Illness and Culture in the Post Modern Age 
 
(Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998), 62.
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Englishman Joseph Carey Merrick, nicknamed “The Elephant Man,” suffered from a
severe form of a rare, disfiguring disorder called Proteus Syndrome. Eng and Chang Bunker,
the original so-called “Siamese Twins,” were conjoined twins who lived, married, and pros-
pered in the United States until their deaths in 1874. For a scholarly account of perhaps the
most famous of the European “wild boys,” see Harlan Lane, 
 
The Wild Boy of Aveyron 
 
(Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).
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arthritis, menopause, and sexual dysfunction. Yet, in a wide variety of
social and professional settings, talking about personal health is perfectly
acceptable today. Urbane young adults freely chat about their carpal
tunnel syndrome, migraines, and antidepressants.
Today, when serious illness strikes—whether cancer, multiple sclero-
sis, Alzheimer’s, or AIDS—it is common to share the news with friends,
neighbors, and employers; publishing an account of a medical ordeal in
a magazine or newspaper or on the Internet is also commonplace. More-
over, numerous popular reality television programs follow the course
of real people’s hospital care. Patients voluntarily Webcast childbirth,
cosmetic procedures, and cancer surgery.
 
Privacy Isn’t Everything: The Benefits of
Health Disclosure
 
The new openness about health concerns has public health and private
health benefits.
 
4
 
 For example, freely sharing health information with
family and friends makes it easier for them to serve as appropriate care-
givers. Freely sharing health information with nurses and doctors makes
it possible to receive appropriate medical care. Sharing health informa-
tion with employers makes it possible to receive important disability ac-
commodations and sick leaves. Sharing information with managed care
administrators and insurance companies can be unpleasant, but useful
and necessary because they pay the bills, and need to do so accurately and
efficiently. The same is true of sharing health information with govern-
ment administrators who process applications for, for example, Medic-
aid, or who administer public health services. In the case of children and
students, sharing health information with schools is imperative for the
design of appropriate, fair, and safe programs of instruction. Schools
need to know about vaccinations, allergies, hearing and sight losses,
learning disabilities, and emotional disturbances.
 
Privacy Still Matters
 
Medical openness is beneficial, and a willingness to share medical data
is a practical necessity. But medical privacy has not lost all of its value
and appeal. Indeed, a preference for privacy is a familiar dimension of
the experience of ill health. When we are encountering ourselves as
unwell or dying, many of us seek to conceal the fact and extent of our
problems from others. We get picky about who knows what, about when
and how our health information is passed along.
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See Anita L. Allen, 
 
Why Privacy Isn’t Everything 
 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Little-
field, 2003).
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Although as a society we have grown more open about health mat-
ters, deeply felt preferences for privacy remain. I believe these are worth
protecting. Fortunately, the weight of current governmental and non-
governmental policy rightly assumes the continuing social value of
selective concealment and consensual disclosure of health information.
Unfortunately, as health information privacy is finally getting the atten-
tion it deserves, little is being done to address health privacies that can-
not be reduced to the protection of data.
But first the good news. Health insurance reform, the AIDS epi-
demic, the Human Genome Project, and the Internet all spawned pro-
posals for federal legislation regulating health privacy. Every state has
adopted medical record confidentiality laws, including some that are
disease-specific. Federal regulations now mandate more health infor-
mation privacy in clinical care and research than ever before.
Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
 
5
 
 The statute mandated efficiency in health
finance administration through electronic standardization of medical
records. More familiarly, the statute mandated medical information pri-
vacy through rules requiring confidentiality and patient consent for dis-
semination of physician medical records to third parties. Privacy rules
called for by HIPAA were promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services. Medical records are still available to insurers, re-
searchers, and law enforcement, but they are less available to em-
ployers, marketers, and certain others.
Now for the bad news. Most health privacy law merely regulates
access to health information, information in medical records, and the
confidential conversations among medical providers or providers and
patients. However, the desire for medical privacy is fuller-bodied than
the usual discussions of physician/patient confidentiality and access to
medical data suggest. Desires for solitude, dignity, and intimacy sur-
round the experience of illness and injury. These are neglected in our
bloodless contemporary obsession with the confidentiality and electronic
security of health data.
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Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110
Stat 1936 (1996) (HIPAA). Concerning HIPAA: “The privacy provisions of the federal law,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), apply to health
information created or maintained by health care providers who engage in certain electronic
transactions, health plans, and health care clearinghouses. The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has issued the regulation, ‘Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information,’ applicable to entities covered by HIPAA. The Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) is the Departmental component responsible for implementing and en-
forcing the privacy regulation.” Department of Health and Human Services, http://www.
hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/bkgrnd.html (official Web site of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services, last visited 17 July 2002).
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Smile for the Doctor, Henry
 
On 23 September 1970, Henry Berthiaume was dying of cancer in a hos-
pital room in the state of Maine. His wife was at his bedside. In walked
Dr. Loring Pratt, whom Henry had not seen for about three weeks. A
nurse accompanied the doctor. Dr. Pratt, a specialist in the field of oto-
laryngology, had been Henry’s surgeon, treating his larynx cancer by
performing a laryngectomy. Later, when a malignant tumor appeared
in Henry’s neck, Pratt performed a radical neck dissection.
Henry Berthiaume and Dr. Loring Pratt had fought a valiant fight,
but to no avail. Now, the end was near for Henry. Medically speaking,
there was nothing else Dr. Pratt could do for Henry. Still, Dr. Pratt paid
the dying man one last visit. But why? Was it a social visit to offer sym-
pathy and comfort? It was not. Dr. Pratt came to take pictures.
Dr. Pratt’s photo shoot is memorialized in the opinion of Judge
Pomeroy of the Maine high court, issued in a lawsuit against the physi-
cian.
 
6
 
 Doctors are used to being sued for medical malpractice, but this
was something quite different. The administrator of Henry Berthiaume’s
estate brought a lawsuit on the dead man’s behalf for invasion of pri-
vacy and assault and battery.
The same man who had tried to save Henry’s life, made the final
hours of his life more miserable ones. As described by the court,
 
[E]ither Dr. Pratt or the nurse, at his direction, raised the dying Mr.
Berthiaume’s head and placed some blue operating room toweling under
his head and beside him on the bed. The appellee [Dr. Pratt] testified
that this blue toweling was placed there for the purpose of obtaining a
color contrast for the photographs which he proposed to take. He
then proceeded to take several photographs of Mr. Berthiaume.
. . . Mr. Berthiaume protested the taking of pictures by raising a
clenched fist and moving his head in an attempt to remove his head
from the camera’s range. [Dr. Pratt] . . . himself testified that before
taking the pictures he had been told by Mrs. Berthiaume when he
talked with her in the corridor before entering the room that she
“didn’t think that Henry wanted his picture taken.”
It is the raising of the deceased’s head in order to put the operat-
ing room towels under and around him that appellant claims was an
assault and battery. It is the taking of the pictures of the dying Mr.
Berthiaume that [the Estate] . . . claims constituted the actionable
invasion of Mr. Berthiaume’s right to privacy.
 
7
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Estate of Henry Berthiaume v. Loring Pratt
 
, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976).
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Id. at 793.
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A lower state court had rejected the claim against Dr. Pratt and had
directed a verdict in his favor. But while recognizing the “benefit to the
science of medicine which comes from the making of photographs of
the treatment and of medical abnormalities found in patients” the high
court held that a directed verdict was a reversible error and ordered a
new trial. The court expressly recognized (for the very first time) that
the right to privacy existed in the state of Maine, and held that a jury
could find both that Dr. Pratt invaded Mr. Berthiaume’s right to pri-
vacy and that he committed an assault and battery.
 
About Face
 
I believe the Maine court reached the right conclusion for two reasons.
First, there is something highly private about representations of the
human face. For a hundred years American courts have recognized a
moral and legal interest in not having photographs of oneself taken
and publicized without permission. Indeed the privacy of the face was
the first privacy right recognized by a state supreme court, a hundred
years ago.
 
8
 
 Faces are special: “The facial characteristics or peculiar
caste of one’s features, whether normal or distorted, belong to the indi-
vidual and may not be reproduced without his permission. Even the
photographer who is authorized to take a portrait is not justified in
making or retaining additional copies for himself.”
 
9
 
There is something especially private, too, about the post-surgical
body. After a surgery, especially major craniofacial surgery and ampu-
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See 
 
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.
 
, 122 Ga. 190; 50 S.E. 68; 1905:
“Liberty includes the right to live as one will, so long as that will does not interfere with the
rights of another or of the public. One may desire to live a life of seclusion; another may
desire to live a life of publicity; still another may wish to live a life of privacy as to certain
matters and of publicity as to others. One may wish to live a life of toil where his work is of
a nature that keeps him constantly before the public gaze; while another may wish to live a
life of research and contemplation, only moving before the public at such times and under
such circumstances as may be necessary to his actual existence. Each is entitled to a liberty
of choice as to his manner of life, and neither an individual nor the public has a right to
arbitrarily take away from him his liberty.”
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Quoting 
 
Clayman v. Bernstein
 
, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940), in which a plaintiff who
experienced mental anguish sued a physician to enjoin his developing film and printing
photos from negatives of photographs of her disfigured face following medical treatment: “A
man may object to any invasion, as well as to an unlimited invasion. . . . Plaintiff’s picture
was taken without her authority or consent. Her right to decide whether her facial
characteristics should be recorded for another’s benefit or by reason of another’s
capriciousness has been violated. The scope of the authorization defines the extent of the acts
necessary to constitute a violation. If plaintiff had consented to have her photograph taken
only for defendant’s private files certainly he would have no right to exhibit it to others
without her permission. Can it be said that his rights are equally extensive when even that
limited consent has not been given?” Id. at 546–47.
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tations, patients are left with concerns about body image and social
acceptance that may lead to new, stronger privacy preferences, rooted
in vulnerability, fear of rejection or discrimination, and shame. Hid-
ing what one regards as disfigurements beneath a bed sheet, clothing,
or bandage is a way to reduce social anxieties, bolster self-esteem, and
avoid unwanted attention.
 
The Sanctity of Dying
 
The second reason I agree with the holding of this case, is that the dying
have special, complex needs for privacy, intimacy, and flexible choices.
Sometimes the dying want to be alone. Sometimes they do not want to
be alone, but want to be only with particular people who know them
well. These privacy preferences can be utterly unreasonable in situa-
tions that require sharing, accountability, or collective efforts. Yet there
are occasions when nothing less than respect for human dignity and
welfare demand that the unwanted stranger, and even the unwanted
friend, stay away. Illnesses, including the hopeless ones that spell the
end of life, are such occasions. At such a time, if the dying person is
cognizant of the world around him or her, his or her need for privacy
and selective intimacy is great. Dying is a time of acceptance, reconcili-
ation, religious ritual, and final intimate exchanges with close friends
and family. Dr. Pratt did not seem to grasp these things.
 
He Doesn’t Listen, Doctor
 
Leo Tolstoy’s novella 
 
The Death of Ivan Ilyich
 
 tells the story of the dead
and dying Ivan Ilyich. Ivan was a once proud and prospering public
servant doomed to leave this world at the age of forty-five. Ivan had
an ambivalent relationship with privacy. All of us, when we are dying,
want to be alone, and then again we do not want to be alone.
Tolstoy writes of Ivan that “[l]et alone, he feels horribly depressed,
wants to call someone, but knows before hand that with others present
it will be even worse.” Solitude is difficult in the context of terminal ill-
ness because in solitude we more easily come face to face with “It,” the
singular reality of our own mortality. That reality can be terrifying,
especially to someone suddenly faced with premature death. Quoting
Tolstoy, describing Ivan:
 
He went to his study, lay down, and once again was left alone with It.
Face to face with It, unable to do anything with It. Simply look at It
and grow numb with horror.
 
When visited by his friend Pyotr, Ivan found an excuse to keep the man
with him longer than he was really needed:
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Pyotr headed for the door. Ivan Ilyich was terrified at the thought of
being left alone. “What can I do to keep him here,” he thought, “Oh,
of course, the medicine.”
 “Pyotr, give me my medicine.”
 
As we die, we want to be visited, cared for, comforted, and so, we want
not to be alone.
And yet, like Ivan, we can at times feel too self-conscious for com-
pany. In company we can feel pathetic, and repulsive. Ivan was “horri-
fied, particularly horrified to see the limp way his hair clung to his pale
brow” and “knew he would be even more horrified by the sight of his
body so while his shirt was being changed he avoided looking at it.”
In the company of others while ill one can feel patronized and
guilty. This especially bothered Ivan Ilyich: “[O]thers will lie to make
you feel better, blame you for your illness.” Ivan’s self-absorbed wife
was masterly at the guilt trip: “He just doesn’t listen you know,” she
told Ivan’s doctor.
 
Just Footage
 
It was a terrible automobile accident. Two members of the Shulman fam-
ily were trapped inside a car that had gone off the road. A rescue heli-
copter was dispatched to the scene to quickly transport the victims to a
hospital. The Shulmans survived and recovered from their nightmare.
But then something made them heartsick. They watched their ordeal on
a documentary television show, 
 
On Scene: Emergency Response
 
.
 
10
 
 No
permission had been sought or given. The Shulmans claimed in a law-
suit that the television producers had “intruded into a realm of personal
privacy and gave unwanted publicity to private events of their lives.”
When the “medical transport and rescue helicopter crew came to
plaintiffs’ assistance,” they were “accompanied . . . by a video camera
operator employed by a television producer.” Unknown to the accident
victims at the time of the wreck, “The cameraman filmed plaintiffs’ extri-
cation from the car, the flight nurse and medic’s efforts to give them med-
ical care during the extrication, and their transport to the hospital in the
helicopter. The flight nurse wore a small microphone that picked up her
conversations with other rescue workers and with one of the plaintiffs.”
We are human beings with dignity and personality. We are more than
news footage. We feel that our moments of agony, our confrontations
with “It” should be respected with privacy. In addition, the visceral
sources of shame and embarrassment attendant to illness and injury are
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Ruth Shulman et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Group W Productions, Inc., et al.
 
, 18
Cal. 4th 200; 955 P.2d 469; 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1998).
 
face to face with 
 
“
 
it
 
”
 
307
 
unpleasant to acknowledge privately, much less speak and write about.
Sick people seldom resemble the ideal products of diet, exercise, cos-
metic surgery, airbrushing, and electronic enhancement dished out by
the media. The sight, sound, and smell of unhealthy bodies can be un-
pleasant. Sadly, we may be repulsed by our unwell or declining bodies
and correctly believe that others are, too. Pain, one of the key indicia
of unwellness, can itself be a source of embarrassment. Pain can trigger
emotions and behaviors we are embarrassed to let others observe. Pain,
like other symptoms of illness, can turn sufferers into objects of unwanted
pity and attention. Self-esteem premised on beauty, vigor, or indepen-
dence sometimes goes out the window with illness and aging, to be re-
placed with feelings of low self-esteem and heightened vulnerability.
 
Why Privacy?
 
As standard accounts of the value of health privacy emphasize, people
rely upon privacy to help control or limit health disclosures that could
result in tangible, material losses.
 
11
 
 Potential losses can be major. They
include loss of employment, loss of insurance, loss of school choice,
loss of community standing, and loss of intimacy.
 
12
 
 Protecting health
information through privacy policies serves an important material loss
minimization function in a world in which discrimination and rejection
can flow from news of health or genetic status.
Even when people do not have to worry much about whether
health disclosure will result in the sorts of material losses just named,
they will often seek privacy nonetheless. Mr. Berthiaume was not con-
cerned about losing his job or social standing, nor was Ruth Shulman.
People commonly rely upon seclusion and intimacy, as Ivan Ilyich did
with considerable ambivalence at first, to facilitate what I term “respon-
sive reflection.” Self-consciously or instinctively, when a person first dis-
covers a health problem, she may want to be alone and secretive in order
to allow herself time to react, reflect, and make plans. Some health prob-
lems require a good deal of planning about how to meet responsibilities
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Lawrence O. Gostin and James G. Hodge Jr., “Piercing the Veil of Secrecy in HIV/AIDS
and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and Disclosure in Partner
Notification,” 
 
Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 
 
5 (1998): 9–88, 66, 70; and Law-
rence Gostin, Joan Turek-Brezina, Madison Powers, and Rene Kozloff, “Privacy and the
Security of Health Information in the Emerging Health Care System,”
 
 Health Matrix: Jour-
nal of Medicine
 
 5 (1995): 1–36, 2, 21–24, stressing autonomy values and justice concerns.
See generally, Charles Culver, James Moor, William Duerfeldt, Marshall Kapp, and Mark
Sullivan, “Privacy,” 
 
Professional Ethics
 
 3.3 and 4 (1994): 3–25.
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See, e.g., Neil Holtzman and David Shapiro, “The New Genetics: Genetic Testing and Pub-
lic Policy,” 
 
British Medical Journal
 
 316 (7134): 852–56 (1998), who describe denial of health and
life insurance, along with employment constraints, as risks of genetics-related health disclosures.
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and answer accountability imperatives. Privacy functions as a tool for re-
sponsive reflection, that is, reflection in response to new information
and belief about personal health.
Privacy allows for what might be termed “emotional distress mini-
mization.” The discovery of health problems may cause anxiety and
emotion. Unfortunately, for some, illness leads to shame, embarrass-
ment, and defeat that lower self-esteem and increase feelings of vulner-
ability. Imagine how Henry Berthiaume must have felt with a gaping
hole in his neck. Hoping to manage common forms of psychological
distress brought on by health concerns, a person may choose solitude
or seclusion. These privacies can help avoid the amplification of feel-
ings of low self-esteem and heightened vulnerability. In this respect,
privacy functions as a tool of emotional distress minimization.
Ethicists have made the moral case for material loss minimization by
reference to the overlapping moral ideals of respect for dignity, autonomy,
and justice. The case for responsive reflection and emotional distress
minimization can be made by reference to those same ideals, but is also
supported, more directly, by ideals of respect for social boundaries and
needs (including intimacy, friendship, civility, trust, or accountability)
and respect for psychological boundaries and needs (including solitude,
repose, composure, self-expression, or reduction of social anxiety).
 
Conclusion
 
The seeming trend toward openness about health matters could mean
most Americans are prepared to accept health information policies that
stress the societal benefits of information accessibility over the societal
and individual benefits of stringent privacy protection. Yet people with
consistently traditional privacy sensibilities deserve protection no less
than people with the newer sensibilities or idiosyncratic admixtures of
old and new.
There is scant basis for believing that most Americans are prepared
to surrender health privacy choices outright. It is one thing to chat with
a stranger about your broken leg while waiting for coffee at Starbucks,
and something else to share with anyone, under compulsion, the ago-
nies of being face to face with “It.”
In our liberal society we need the legal policies we have got; policies
that presumptively vest certain alienable rights to control health data
disclosures in the individual. But we also need humane medical practices,
medical research, and journalism, not addressed in our state and fed-
eral health information privacy statutes. We must think about health pri-
vacy broadly and make careful choices for ourselves, our families, and
communities that show appreciation for the diversity of health privacies.
